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--> Computer Science > Cryptography and Security arXiv:2606.26967 (cs) [Submitted on 25 Jun 2026] Title: Protocol Prying: Systematic Vulnerability Research in the Apple AirDrop and Android Quick Share Proximity Transfer Protocols Authors: Arash Ale Ebrahim , Nils Ole Tippenhauer View a PDF of the paper titled Protocol Prying: Systematic Vulnerability Research in the Apple AirDrop and Android Quick Share Proximity Transfer Protocols, by Arash Ale Ebrahim and 1 other authors View PDF HTML (experimental) Abstract: Apple AirDrop and Google/Samsung Quick Share are proximity file-transfer protocols used by over five billion devices, yet their application-layer security properties remain largely unstudied because both stacks are proprietary and undocumented. Both protocols are reachable from wireless proximity without any prior pairing and process complex serialized content (binary plists, CPIO archives, Protocol Buffers, UKEY2 handshakes) inside privileged daemons, making them attractive zero-click targets across multiple operating systems. We perform the first cross-platform reverse engineering and protocol-aware fuzzing study of both stacks. We reconstruct AirDrop's seven-layer state machine and DVZip adaptive compression from binary analysis, build AIRFUZZ, a protocol-aware fuzzer that mutates pre-compression representations, and complement it with targeted hand-written analyses of Samsung's Quick Share service and Google's Quick Share for Windows. We discover six vulnerabilities (V1-V6): three pre-authentication issues in macOS/iOS AirDrop (V1: Swift fatalError DoS in the HTTP path router; V2: unbounded XML plist recursion in Foundation; V3: NULL dereference in this http URL 's HTTP/1.1 parser), two protocol-layer flaws in Samsung Quick Share (V4: pre-authentication OfflineFrame dispatch; V5: D2D encryption bypass for three frame types), and a heap use-after-free in Google Quick Share for Windows (V6) for which Google awarded a bounty. We responsibly disclosed all findings, and Apple, Samsung, and Google have acknowledged the reports. Comments: 15 pages, 4 figures Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) Cite as: arXiv:2606.26967 [cs.CR] (or arXiv:2606.26967v1 [cs.CR] for this version) https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.26967 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite Submission history From: Arash Ale Ebrahim [ view email ] [v1] Thu, 25 Jun 2026 12:40:13 UTC (2,523 KB) Full-text links: Access Paper: View a PDF of the paper titled Protocol Prying: Systematic Vulnerability Research in the Apple AirDrop and Android Quick Share Proximity Transfer Protocols, by Arash Ale Ebrahim and 1 other authors View PDF HTML (experimental) TeX Source view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev | next > new | recent | 2026-06 Change to browse by: cs References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar export BibTeX citation Loading... BibTeX formatted citation &times; loading... Data provided by: Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer ( What is the Explorer? ) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers ( What is Connected Papers? ) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps ( What is Litmaps? ) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations ( What are Smart Citations? ) Code, Data, Media Code, Data and Media Associated with this Article alphaXiv Toggle alphaXiv ( What is alphaXiv? ) Links to Code Toggle CatalyzeX Code Finder for Papers ( What is CatalyzeX? ) DagsHub Toggle DagsHub ( What is DagsHub? ) GotitPub Toggle Gotit.pub ( What is GotitPub? ) Huggingface Toggle Hugging Face ( What is Huggingface? ) ScienceCast Toggle ScienceCast ( What is ScienceCast? ) Demos Demos Replicate Toggle Replicate ( What is Replicate? ) Spaces Toggle Hugging Face Spaces ( What is Spaces? ) Spaces Toggle TXYZ.AI ( What is TXYZ.AI? ) Related Papers Recommenders and Search Tools Link to Influence Flower Influence Flower ( What are Influence Flowers? ) Core recommender toggle CORE Recommender ( What is CORE? ) Author Venue Institution Topic About arXivLabs arXivLabs: experimental projects with community collaborators arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website. Both individuals and organizations that work with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and user data privacy. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners that adhere to them. Have an idea for a project that will add value for arXiv's community? Learn more about arXivLabs . Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax ( What is MathJax? )