영국 에이번 세머셋 경찰이 50만 명에 달하는 민감한 개인정보를 수집해 기계학습 기반의 범죄 위험도를 측정했으나, 일부 모델은 예측 성능이 현저히 떨어져 결국 폐기되었습니다. 경찰의 불투명한 알고리즘 운용 방식은 시민들의 데이터 주권 침해와 공공의 신뢰 하락을 초래할 수 있다는 심각한 우려를 낳고 있습니다.
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'씽크 패밀리 데이터베이스(Think Family Database)'는 영국 브리스톨시에 거주하는 거의 50만 명에 달하는 사람들의 기록을 보유하고 있습니다. 수년 동안 이들 중 극소수만이 이 사실을 알고 있었습니다. 2016년 브리스톨 시의회와 지역 에이번 세머셋(Avon and Somerset) 경찰이 출범시킨 이 데이터베이스는 경찰 정보 보고서, 주택 상태, 정신 건강 기록, 10대 임신, 양육 강좌 등록 여부, 무료 학교 급식 등 온갖 종류의 민감한 정보를 저장해 왔습니다. 관리들은 이 민감한 데이터를 기반으로 기계학습(machine-learning) 모델을 구축하여 수천 명의 성인과 아동에게 점수를 매겼습니다. 이들은 해당 지역의 소위 '위협, 피해 및 위험에 대한 그림'을 구축하기를 희망했습니다.
2022년 초 관리들이 아동 착취 범죄를 해결하도록 돕기 위해 마련된 행사에서, 한 경찰 데이터 과학자는 이러한 접근 방식의 일부를 이렇게 설명했습니다. "저는 기본적으로 모든 데이터를 큰 양동이에 쏟아부은 다음, 데이터 과학이란 주걱으로 저어서, 모든 사람에 대한 멋진 위험 점수를 얻어냅니다." 씽크 패밀리 데이터베이스 내에서 이루어진 이러한 위험도 채점은 에이번 세머셋 경찰의 방대한 예측 분석 프로그램의 일부에 불과했습니다. 해당 경찰서가 만든 최소 23개의 개별 모델 중에는 사람들이 절도를 저지를 위험, 법정에 출석하지 않을 위험, 실종될 위험 또는 가정폭력 피해자가 될 위험을 식별하는 알고리즘도 포함되어 있었습니다. 한 고위 경찰관은 이 지역의 가장 위험한 범죄자들의 '순위표'를 작성했다고 설명했는데, 이는 해당 지역의 약 30만 명에 대한 데이터를 보유하도록 설계된 '범죄자 관리 앱(Offender Management App)'을 암시하는 것으로 보입니다.
경찰이 예측 도구를 어떻게 개발하고 사용해 왔는지는 대중에게 항상 명확하게 공개되지 않았습니다. 브리스톨의 지역 경찰 책임 감시 그룹의 리더인 존 페그램(John Pegram)은 이 앱이 만들어진 지 수년이 지난 2023년이 되어서야 '범죄자 관리 앱'에 대해 처음 들었습니다. 이를 알게 되었을 때, 그는 자신도 이 앱에 포함되어 있을지도 모른다고 의심하기 시작했습니다. 페그램은 "제가 그 앱에 올라 있다는 걸 알고 있었던 것 같다"고 말합니다. 2024년 초, 페그램은 경찰이 자신의 데이터를 어떻게 사용하고 있는지 알아보기 위해 정보 공개 요청을 제기했습니다. 경찰은 이에 대한 답변을 거부했습니다. 몇 달 뒤, 페그램이 사건을 맡을 변호사를 고용한 후에야 경찰은 그가 앱에 포함되어 있음을 확인했지만 더 이상의 자세한 설명은 거부했습니다. 브리스톨 전역, 영국, 그리고 점차 전 세계의 다른 사람들과 마찬가지로, 페그램은 자신이 알고리즘에 의해 점수가 매겨졌는지 여부, 그 점수가 무엇일 수 있는지, 또는 그것이 당국과의 교류에 어떤 영향을 미칠 수 있는지 알지 못했습니다.
와이어드(WIRED)는 비영리 뉴스룸인 리버티 인베스티게이츠(Liberty Investigates), 브리스톨 케이블(Bristol Cable), 라이트하우스 리포츠(Lighthouse Reports)와 협력하여 정보 공개 청구를 통해 수백 쪽에 달하는 문서를 입수했으며, 이를 통해 에이번 세머셋 지역의 데이터 수집 및 예측 분석 실험에 대한 지금까지 가장 포괄적인 전모를 구축했습니다. (리버티 인베스티게이츠의 모회사인 리버티는 이 프로그램에 대한 잠재적인 법적 도전에 초기부터 관여했었으며, 현재도 페그램의 소송을 지속적으로 지원하고 있습니다.)
조사 결과, 브리스톨 시의회 직원들이 더 이상 신뢰할 수 없다고 판단한 후 최소 두 개의 위험 채점 모델이 조용히 폐기된 것으로 나타났습니다. 이전에 보고되지 않았던 문서들에 따르면, 정부 감사관 및 독립 검토자들은 이 프로그램의 일부 요소에 대해 놀라울 정도로 투명성이 부족하다는 점을 지적했으며, 이러한 시스템이 대중의 신뢰를 훼손할 수 있다고 경고했습니다. 와이어드의 요청으로 데이터를 검토한 독립 분석가에 따르면, 와이어드에 공개된 36,000개 이상의 모델 성능 점수를 포함한 경찰 데이터는 일부 사례에서 '실망스러울 정도로 낮은 예측 성능(genuinely poor predictive performance)'을 보여주는 것으로 나타났습니다. 이러한 조사 결과는 영국이 형사 사법 시스템 전반에 걸쳐 예측 분석과 인공지능을 도입하려는 움직임을 보이고 있는 시점에 나온 것입니다. 이러한 변화를 이끄는 데 앞장서고 있는 친숙한 인물이 있는데, 바로 에이번 세머셋의 전 경찰국장이자 현재 잉글랜드와 웨일스 전역의 경찰력을 위한 국가 표준 설정 기관을 이끌고 있는 앤디 마시(Andy Marsh)입니다. 폴리싱 칼리지(College of Policing)의 CEO인 마시는 다음과 같이 말했습니다.
Comment Loader Save Story Save this story Comment Loader Save Story Save this story The Think Family Database holds records on close to half a million people who live in the city of Bristol, England. For many years, few of them knew anything about it. Launched in 2016 by the Bristol City Council and the regional Avon and Somerset Police, the database has stored all manner of sensitive information—police intelligence reports, housing status, mental health records, teenage pregnancies, enrollment in parenting courses, free school meals. On top of this sensitive data, officials built machine-learning models to assign scores to thousands of adults and children. They hoped to build what they called a “picture of threat, harm, and risk” in the region. At an event in early 2022 to help officials tackle child exploitation crimes, one police data scientist described part of the approach this way: “I essentially dump all that data in a big bucket and stir it with a data-science spatula, and we come out with a lovely risk score for everybody.” This risk scoring inside the Think Family Database was just one part of Avon and Somerset Police’s sprawling predictive analytics program. Among at least 23 separate models the force created were algorithms to identify the risk that people would commit burglary, fail to turn up in court, go missing, or become a victim of domestic abuse. One senior officer described creating a “league table” of the area’s most dangerous criminals—an apparent reference to the Offender Management App, which was designed to hold data on around 300,000 people in the region. How the police have developed and used their predictive tools hasn’t always been clear to the public. John Pegram, the leader of a local police accountability group in Bristol, says he didn’t hear about the Offender Management App until 2023, years after it had been created. When he did learn about it, he began to suspect he might be included. “I think I knew I was on the app,” Pegram says. In early 2024, Pegram filed a request to find out how the police were using his data. The police refused to say. Months later, after Pegram had hired solicitors to work on his case, the police confirmed he was on the app but declined to elaborate further. Like others across Bristol, the UK, and, increasingly, around the world, Pegram didn’t know whether he had been scored by an algorithm, what that score might be, or how it could affect his interactions with the authorities. WIRED, working in partnership with the nonprofit newsroom Liberty Investigates , plus the Bristol Cable and Lighthouse Reports, obtained hundreds of pages of documentation from public records requests to build the most comprehensive picture to date of Avon and Somerset’s regional experiment with data collection and predictive analytics. (Liberty, the parent organization of Liberty Investigates, had some early involvement in a potential legal challenge to the program and continues to support Pegram’s litigation.) The investigation reveals that at least two of these risk-scoring models were quietly abandoned after Bristol City Council staff deemed they could no longer trust them. Previously unreported documents show government inspectors and independent reviewers highlighting a startling lack of transparency about some elements of the program and warning that the systems could undermine public trust. Police data disclosed to WIRED—comprising more than 36,000 model performance scores—appear in some cases to show “genuinely poor predictive performance,” according to an independent analyst who reviewed the data for WIRED. These findings come as the UK appears poised to embrace predictive analytics and artificial intelligence across the criminal justice system. A familiar face is helping lead the charge: the former chief constable of Avon and Somerset, Andy Marsh, who now heads the national standard-setting body for forces across England and Wales. As CEO of the College of Policing, Marsh has said that effective AI should be “injected like heroin” to speed up British police work. In a recent interview , Marsh said his organization was examining around 100 currently deployed AI tools, including for predictive policing. “Our job is to test the ones that work properly, test them with rigorous evaluation, and then spread them like wildfire through policing.” In 2014, Avon and Somerset Police was under pressure on multiple fronts. The force, like others across the UK, had seen its budgets slashed. Its chief constable had been suspended . An official report had highlighted its failure to stick to procedures to protect some victims of domestic abuse. After that report was published, the force’s head of performance said , “We believe predictive analytics is the solution.” Gary Davies, a former police chief superintendent who had moved to a role at the Bristol City Council two years earlier, was thinking along similar lines. Davies led a team at the council supporting children and families. When families were in crisis, “it was blatantly obvious,” he says. It was much harder to spot those who were at the top of a downward spiral. Davies believed the answer lay in data. A child’s school might hold a record of increasing absences, while the police might know if the child had recently witnessed domestic abuse for the first time. On their own, these might not be enough to trigger an intervention from social services. But together? “If you could see the whole picture, you would realize that the trajectory they were on was going in the wrong direction,” he says. Starting in 2015, a small group of Bristol City Council and Avon and Somerset Police staff moved into one of the city’s police stations to work on a solution to that problem together . The Insight Bristol team, headed by Davies, started pulling together data from across the public sector to provide frontline workers with all the information they might need about children and families. The Insight Bristol team didn’t seek residents’ consent to use their data in the Think Family Database. Instead, Davies explains, the team relied on “legal gateways”—a term that describes when data sharing is deemed necessary to meet an agency’s legal obligations, such as the need to protect children. “If you were to give the impression that people had consent, then it creates a false illusion, because, actually, as [a] local authority or police or whoever, we have to keep those records.” Initially, residents could not opt out of the database; later, the council included an opt-out option in its tax letters to residents. Davies, who recently retired, believes the project did help protect children. “It improved the understanding of risk and vulnerability for children and families,” he says. “It provided that information in a far more efficient way.” When it came to communicating that to the public, Davies says, “it was fairly difficult to get any enthusiasm or interest from groups of people.” Those who did engage said they understood the need to use personal data, he recalls, summarizing the feedback as “We don't mind you using it to support us, but we don't want you to use it against us.” While the Insight Bristol team was busy creating the Think Family Database, Avon and Somerset Police had begun exploring the potential of predictive analytics. In March 2016, the force’s ethics committee met to consider how the work should proceed. Members advised that “careful consideration had to be given to what data is used” and “the variables that are used in the process,” concluding: “The use of the system must be treated with some caution and it must be ensured that there is no bias.” The committee advised that, if the force’s predictive analytics work was to proceed, “the public must be informed as to why and how you are carrying out such processes.” Once work to compile the Think Family Database was completed, a police data scientist spearheaded the development of predictive risk models for the