최근 수년 중 최악의 리눅스 취약점, 전 세계를 덮치다

Text settings Story text Size Small Standard Large Width * Standard Wide Links Standard Orange * Subscribers only Learn more Minimize to nav Publicly released exploit code for an effectively unpatched vulnerability that gives root access to virtually all releases of Linux is setting off alarm bells as defenders scramble to ward off severe compromises inside data centers and on personal devices. The vulnerability and exploit code that exploits it were released Wednesday evening by researchers from security firm Theori, five weeks after privately disclosing it to the Linux kernel security team. The team patched the vulnerability in versions 7.0 , 6.19.12 , 6.18.12 , 6.12.85, 6.6.137, 6.1.170, 5.15.204, and 5.10.254) but few of the Linux distributions had incorporated those fixes at the time the exploit was released. A single script hacks all distros The critical flaw, tracked as CVE-2026-31431 and the name CopyFail, is a local privilege escalation, a vulnerability class that allows unprivileged users to elevate themselves to administrators. CopyFail is particularly severe because it can be exploited with a single piece of exploit code—released in Wednesday’s disclosure—that works across all vulnerable distributions with no modification. With that, an attacker can, among other things, hack multi-tenant systems, break out of containers based on Kubernetes or other frameworks, and create malicious pull requests that pipe the exploit code through CI/CD work flows. “‘Local privilege escalation’ sounds dry, so let me unpack it,” researcher Jorijn Schrijvershof wrote Thursday . “It means: an attacker who already has some way to run code on the machine, even as the most boring unprivileged user, can promote themselves to root. From there they can read every file, install backdoors, watch every process, and pivot to other systems.” Schrijvershof added that the same Python script Theori released works reliably for Ubuntu 22.04, Amazon Linux 2023, SUSE 15.6, and Debian 12. The researcher continued: Why does that matter on shared infrastructure? Because “local” covers a lot of ground in 2026: every container on a shared Kubernetes node, every tenant on a shared hosting box, every CI/CD job that runs untrusted pull-request code, every WSL2 instance on a Windows laptop, every containerised AI agent given shell access. They all share one Linux kernel with their neighbours. A kernel LPE collapses that boundary. The realistic threat chain looks like this. An attacker exploits a known WordPress plugin vulnerability and gets shell access as www-data. They run the copy.fail PoC. They are now root on the host. Every other tenant is suddenly reachable, in the way I walked through in this hack post-mortem. The vulnerability does not get the attacker onto the box; it changes what happens in the next ten seconds after they land there. The vulnerability stems from a “straight-line” logic flaw in the kernel’s crypto API. Many exploits exploiting race conditions and memory corruption flaws don’t consistently succeed across kernel versions or distributions, and sometimes even on the same machine. Because the code released for CopyFail exploits a logic flaw, “reliability isn’t probabilistic, and the same script works across distributions, researchers from Bugcrowd wrote . “No race window, no kernel offset.” CopyFail gets its name because the authencesn AEAD template process (used for IPsec extended sequence numbers) doesn’t actually copy data when it should. Instead, it “uses the caller’s destination buffer as a scratch pad, scribbles 4 bytes past the legitimate output region, and never restores them,” Theori said. “The ‘copy’ of the AAD ESN bytes ‘fails’ to stay inside the destination buffer.” The worst Linux vuln in years Other security experts echoed the perspective that CopyFail poses a serious threat, with one saying it’s the “worst make-me-root vulnerabilities in the kernel in recent times.” The most recent such Linux vulnerability was Dirty Pipe from 2022 and Dirty Cow in 2016. Both of those vulnerabilities were actively exploited in the wild. Linux distributors frequently stick with older kernel versions and backport fixes into them. There’s no indication in the disclosure deadline that Theori ever contacted the distributors. With the exploit available before fixed distributions were available, the disclosure amounts to something very similar to a zero-day vulnerability being dropped, although the stiffer term is probably “zero-day patch gap.” “The org doing the disclosure… did an absolutely terrible job of vulnerability coordination,” Will Dormann , a senior principal vulnerability analyst at Tharros Labs, said in an interview. “What is mind boggling to me is that in their writeup they both: A) list 4 affected vendors, and B) tell readers to apply vendor patches. But before firing away with the publication, they didn’t bother to see if ANY of the vendors that they list ACTUALLY HAVE PATCHES. (None do).” Theori representatives did not respond when asked to comment. Distributions known to have patched the vulnerability included Arch Linux and RedHat Fedora . Those known to have released mitigation guidance at the time this post went live include: SUSE RedHat Ubuntu People seeking the status of other distributions should check with the respective vendors. Theori said that it discovered the vulnerability after its researcher, Taeyang Lee, found surface area in the crypto subsystem (specifically, splice() hands page-cache pages and scatterlist page provenance) had been underexplored. Using its AI-powered Xint code security tool, the researchers then found the bug after about an hour of scan time. The company said it has also developed an exploit that uses CopyFail to break out of Kubernetes containers. The severity of the threat posed by CopyFail and the likelihood of active exploitation is high enough to warrant all Linux users to investigate their systems immediately. Individual distributors provide useful mitigation guidance, as does the post by Schrijvershof linked above. Dan Goodin Senior Security Editor Dan Goodin Senior Security Editor Dan Goodin is Senior Security Editor at Ars Technica, where he oversees coverage of malware, computer espionage, botnets, hardware hacking, encryption, and passwords. In his spare time, he enjoys gardening, cooking, and following the independent music scene. Dan is based in San Francisco. Follow him at here on Mastodon and here on Bluesky. Contact him on Signal at DanArs.82. 41 Comments